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No. 8

THE NE;UTRALITY OF BRITISH DOMINIONS·

, THE recent Cannes conference has revived the question of the
international status of the British dominions. Article IV of
the proposed Anglo-French Alliance provided that "the present
treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the dominions of the
British Empire unless and until it is approved by the dominion concerned." In short, the dominions were left free to pursue an independent foreign policy in European affairs.
The question of colonial neutrality has been an old thorn in the
flesh to both English and colonial statesmen. From time to time
different propositions have been put forward to relieve the Motherland of her responsibilities or the colonies of their liabilities in time
of war. To this end, James the Second entered into a treaty with
the king of France for the neutrality of their respective colonial
possessions. The question, however, awakened considerably more
interest in the colonies than in the Mother Country. The subject
was discussed incidentally at the Albany conference, but without
result. About the same time the French East India Company
approached its English rival with the proposal that both the ship·
ping and settlements of the respective companies should be neutralized in case of war between the two countries. · The English
Company was favorable to the suggestion, but the English government promptly vetoed it for naval reasons. After that no more was
heard of the subject for about a century.
The question next bobbed up in Australia. The withdrawal of
the British troops from the colonies, together with the threatening
situation in Europe, brought home to the colonies a realization of
their weakness and danger. Accordingly, in 1870 Mr. C. G. Duffy,
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a prominent politician of Victoria, secured the appointment of a
royal commission to deal with the .question of a federal union of
the Australian colonies. This commission, in connection with its
report, brought in an interesting recommendation for the neutrality
of the colonies as a protective measure.
"It has been proposed to establish a Council of the Empire, whose
advice must be taken before war was declared. But this measure
is so foreign to the genius and traditions of the British Constitution, and presupposes so large an abandonment of its functions by
the House of Commons, that we dismiss it from ·consideration.
There remains, however, we think, more than one method by which
the anomaly of the present system may be cured. * * *
The Colony of Victoria, for example, possesses a separate Parliament, Government, and distinguishing flag; a separate naval and
military establishment. All the public appointments are made by
the Local Government. The only officer commissioned from England who exercises authority within its limits is the Queen's representative; and in the Ionian Islands, while they were admittedly
a Sovereign State, the Queen's representative was appointed in the
same manner. The single function of a Sovereign State, as understood in International Law, which the Colony does not exercise or
possess, is the power of contracting obligations with other states.
The want of this power alone distinguishes her position from that
of states undoubtedly sovereign.
If the Queen were authorized by the Imperial Parliament to concede to the greater Colonies the right to make treaties, it is contended
that they would fulfil the conditions constituting a Sovereign State
in as full and perfect a sense as any of the smaller states cited by
public jurists to illustrate this rule of limited responsibility. And
the notable concession to the interest of peace and humanity made
in our own day by the Great Powers with respect to privateers and
to ,merchant shipping renders it probable that they would not, on
any inadequate grounds, refuse to recognize such states as falling
under the rule.
It must not be forgotten that this is a su:bject in which the inter-.
ests of the colonies and of the Mother Country are identical. British
statesmen have long aimed not only to limit more and more the
expenditure incurred for the defence of distant colonies, but to
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withdraw more and more from all ostensible responsibility for their
defense; and they would probably see any honorable method of
adjusting the present anomalous relations with no less satisfaction
than we should.
Nor would the recognition of the neutrality of the self-governed
colonies deprive them of the power of aiding the Mother Country
in any just and necessary war. On the contrary, it would enable
them to aid her with more dignity and effect, as a Sovereign State
could, of its own free will, and at whatever period it thought proper,
elect to become a party to the war.
We are of opinion that this subject ought to be brought under
the notice of the Imperial Government. If the proposal should
receive their sanction, they can ascertain the wishes of the American and African Colonies with respect to it, and finally take the
necessary measures to obtain its recognition as part of the public
law of the civilized world."
This recommendation found favor with a few of the more
advanced politicians and newspapers of the colonies. But on the
whole it met with a hostile or indifferent reception from the general public. None of the Australian governments would have anything to do with it. Some of the leading conservative politicians
condemned it in the strongest terms and the conservative press subjected it to merciless criticism as a one-sided proposition and a disguised form of separation. The agitation could make little headway
in the face of such general opposition. Fortunately for the colonies,
England did not become involved in the European struggle, and
with the passing of the war cloud the neutrality proposal was quietly
dropped by its erstwhile friends and supporters. Nothing more
was heard of the matter until another war cloud hovered over the
Empire.
The question of neutrality again came to the front in an acute
form during the crisis preceding the Boer war. The old racial feud
between the English and Dutch populations had almost died out
when it was again revived by Dr. Jameson's treacherous raid into
the Transvaal. The long drawn-out controversy over the rights of
the Uitlanders added fuel to the flames. Meanwhile the government of the Cape was doing everything possible to bring about a
settlement of the difficulty, but found its efforts blocked by the
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intransigent attitude of the extremists on both sides. The premier
of the colony, W. P. Schreiner, was caught between two fires and
scarcely knew which way to <turn. His sympathies were divided.
He was undoubtedly s.trongly attached to the British connection,
but he was essentially an Africander in his political outlook, and
moreover was intimately connected by marriage and social relations
with leading members of the Dutch race in the Cape and Orange
Free State. Although not himself a Bondsman, he had been chosen
leader of that party and was dependent upon it for support. It
was natural in the circumstances that he should sympathize with
his Dutch fellow subjects in their desire to keep out of the war
with their kinsmen across the Vaal. But he never allowed his sympathies to run away with his duty •to his Sovereign. He was, perhaps, too trustful of 'the loyalty of his colleagues and too tolerant
of the scarcely-veiled sedition of many of his followers, but he was
never a party to, nor did he countenance, the open and secret
intrigues of some of his supporters with the enemies of his country.
He kept hoping a~inst hope that a conflict might be avoided by a
spirit of moderation and justice. Throughout the controversy he
endeavored to m~intain a neutral attitude, but as the war drew
nearer his position became more and more untenable. He could
not continue indefinitely to sit on the political fence. In attempting
to preserve a non-committal attitude, he inevitably came into conflict with the views and interests of the ultramontanes on either
side. On the one hand, he found it increasingly difficult to control
pro-Boer activities in his own party; on the other, he encountered
the open hostility of the loyal British population. , To the la:tter,
his equivocal conduct during the negotiations seemed to fall· little
short of high treason. The crisis could not be delayed much longer.
The negotiations were breaking down and both parties were evidently preparing for war.
·
The opposition accordingly resolved to force the government to
a public declaration of policy. On August 28, 1899, Sir Gordon
Sprigg moved the adjournment ·of the House for the purpose of
considering the question of the removal of arms and ammunition
from Cape Colony into the Orange Free State. In the course of
the debate, Mr. Schreiner announced his intention of maintaining
so- far as possible a neutral position in case_ of war.
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"If I am still to see, despite my best hopes and my deep convictions, that South Africa is to be the scene of war between whites,
that one race is to be set against another race in any part of Africa,
I shall still say-and I say this today, not merely to this colony,
but to South Africa an<;J the world-that I shall do my very best
io maintain for this colony the position of standing apart and aloof
from the struggle, both with regard to its forces and with regard
to its people."
·
A little further on in the same speech he returned to the same
theme.
·
"If that unexpected and unhoped for event (war) is going- to
happen, it will become all of us to stand firmly together against that
plague extending to our house. We shall endeavor then to do all
in our power to preserve that peace which we have sought loyally
and honestly to secure since the day when we put our hands to the
plough of government of this country."
Neither the word nor the doctrine of neutrality, it will be observed,
is to be found anywhere in this speech. The idea, it is true, is
vaguely suggested, but no practical measures are proposed to carry
such a policy into effect.
The opposition apparently did not attach at first much importance or constitutional significance to this declaration. Throughout
the course of the debate they did not see fit to question the correctness of this position. Colonel Shermbrucker, a fire-eating loyalist,
was apparently satisfied with this declaration and was even willing
to meet the government half-way. "If,'' he said, "they on his side
could obtain from the prime minister an assurance that the government would not adopt an attitude hostile to the British power, a
great many members of the opposition would feel more satisfied."
Mr. Rose Innes, one of the most influential members of the House
and a constitutionalist of distinction, took the position that the
imperial government should give the lead to local authorities on
such matters. "As things are now they must depend upon the attitude of the imperial government. When they came forward and
said they did not wish this kind of thing to go on, then it would be
the duty of <the ministers as part of the Empire to see that it did
not." This opportune interpretation of the relative rights and obligations of the Motherland and colonies afforded the hard-pressed
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premier an excellent ground of defense of which he was glad to
avail himself. Accordingly, later in the debate Mr. Schreiner definitely accepted Mr. Innes' statement as a correct political and constitutional exposition of the government's position, and as an evidence of his good faith declared that when. the necessity arose "he
should act in conjunction with the proper authorities.'' In summing up the debate on behalf of the oppositiqn, Sir Go'rdon Sprigg
again arraigned the half-hearted policy of the government in deal:.
ing with the Boers and their Cape friends. But at the same time he
was forced to admit that the government would doubtless do its
duty in case of war. "Of course, when the storm breaks, when war
is actually going on, we know perfectly well what the government
will do, because they will be traitors to the office they hold under
Her Majesty's government if they do anything else than stop the
mur'iitions of war going through which would then go through to a
state in active hostility to Great Britain."
Outside the House an entirely different construction was placed
upon ·the Premier's speech by a part of the press and public. The
Cape Town Times, the leading organ of the opposition, interpreted
these remarks as a formal declaration of neutrality, amounting practically to alienage. Here was an excellent campaign cry, and the
Times proceeded to exploit it for all it was worth. Many of the
ultra-loyalists took up the hue and cry. At.a public meeting at the
capitol under the auspices of the South African League, at which
several members of the parliament occupied seats on the platform,
a resolution was adopted stroµgly disapproving of Mr. Schreiner's
declaration of neutrality. But not all of the English press were
ready· to follow ·this lead. The Kimberley Adviser, for example,
declared that "there is only one way in which the Cape could preserve neutrality in the event of war with the Transvaal, and that
is by ceasing to be a part of the British Empire." But such a policy,
it believed, did not lie w1thin the meaning or intention of the Premier's declaration.
Mr. Schreiner's speech was duly cabled to London, where it stirred
up a veritable hornet's nest in imperialistic circles. The London
Times, which had become the foremost champion of the Uitlanders,
denounced the "extraordinary statement" of Mr. Schreiner in
severest •terms. "That phrase, if it be in its natural sense, betrays
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a startling misconception on the part of Mr. Schreiner of his duty
both as a colonial statesman and as a British subject. What would
have been thought of the governor of an American state who had
declared his intention of keeping his state aloof from the war with
Spain? The issues of peace and war do not rest with the coloni~l
authorities, but with the government of the Queen, and when that
government has declared war, it is the duty of all loyal subjects,
whatever their position, not to keep aloof from the struggle, but to
do their utmost to bring the struggle to a successful end." The St.
James Gazette declared that the attitude of Mr. Schreiner was "not
the least ominous part of the crisis.» The Cape could not be neutral
without involving itself in the process of aiding the Queen's enemies. If Mr. Schreiner were correctly reported, Lord Milner, it
concluded "would be justified 1n dismissing him."
The Liberal papers, however, as might be expected, came to the
defense of the colonial Premier. In a:r;i able editorial, in reply to
the Times, the Westminster Gazette set forth what it believed to
be the true state of affairs.
"It does not appear to occur to these critics that, in preventing
the conflagration from spreading to the Cape, Mr. Schreiner would
probably be doing this country the greatest service that is in his
power to do. Mr. Schreiner does not, of course, mean that he
would try to hinder the transport of men and ammunition through
the Cape Colony. That is out of his power to do, even if he desired
to do it. What he means is that he throws the responsibility of a
war in the Transvaal on the Imperial Government and will leave
the Imperial Government to conduct its own campaign. Mr.
Schreiner probably could do nothing better or wiser, and he would
do well if he could keep the struggle to the Transvaal and its borders. For let us be warned in time that the spread of this controversy threatens something very like civil war at the Cape. Our
Dutch fellow-citizens have of course no veto on operations which
the Imperial Government may think necessary, but their opinion
and the sentiments of the constitutional government at the Cape
must be regarded as elements of capital importance by a British
statesman dealing with the present situation."
The Premier's speech had attained too much notoriety to escape
the attention of the High Commissioner. Sir Alfred Milner, unfor-
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tunately, was not on the most friendly terms with his constitutional
advisers. As British Higli Commissioner in South Africa he had
been entrusted with the conduct of many of the negotiations with
the governments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. These
negotiations, in fact, had largely resolved themselves into a diplomatic duel between President Kruger and himself. It did not take
him long fo realize that he could count on but little, if any, support from the Cape ministers in this crucial struggle. It almost
seemed at times as though the sympathies of the cabinet were on
the side of the Boers rather than of the Crown. It is not surprising, in the circumstances, that Sir Alfred should have been tempted
to look with special favor on the British opposition in the House,
whose views and policies coincided so closely with his own. Unfortunately, he sometimes made too little effort to conceal his political
opinions and sympathies. He was prone to regard himself as an
imperial officer rather than.as a constitutional governor. He was
much more concerned with the maintenance and promotion of British interests in South Africa than with the preservation of the
principles of responsi:ble government. There was, in truth, an unfortunate incompatibility between the functions of High Commissioner
"' and Colonial Governor. As an imperial officer, he was free to pursue an independent policy ; as colonial governor, he was <Q!'.pected
to follow the advice of his responsible ministers. The position was
an impossible one. He could not be an imperial viceroy and a provincial figurehead at one and the same time.
The High Commissioner, as was to be expected, took a serious
view of Mr. Schreiner's speech. In a critical dispatch to Joseph
Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, he set forth his
view of the. political situation in con~iderable detail.
"It will be observed that Mr. Schreiner,· while gladly availing
himself of the defense which Mr. Innes's argument afforded him
for not having taken the initiative in stopping the export of munitions of war to the Orange Free State, by no means committed himself to accepting the logical consequence of that view, viz., that he
would be bound to stop such export, if requested -to do so By the
Imperial Government. On the contrary, many ~ressions of his
speech are only compatible with the view that the Colony is virtually
an independent state, which could, if it chose, remain neutral in a
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conflict in which the Empire was engaged. This position is alto-.
gether inconsistent with that of Mr. Innes.
.
The natural sympathy which one cannot but feel -with Mr.
Schreiner in his earnest desire to preserve the Colony from war
cannot be allowed to obscure the import of his remarkable declaration. It would seem to be the opinion of the Prime Min!ster, doubtless representing in this the views of the Cabinet, that in case of
the British Empire being at war-and at war with states bordering
op. the Colony,-the Colony should take no part, and that its forces,
every man of whom is enrolled in the name of and has taken an
oath of allegiance to the Queen, should stand 'apart and aloof from
the struggle.' These words seem to fall little short of a declaration of independence, and amount virtually to a policy of separating
the colony, if only pro hac vice, from the Empire of which it forms
a part.
The position which would be created, .if the Ministry were to
carry out the policy indicated in Mr. Schreiner's speech, would be
one new in the history of the relations between Great Britain and
her self-governing colonies.
Many wars have been waged by Great Britain in which these colonies have taken no active part. They have been wars far from
their borders, on which the colonial forces, small in number and
intended only for local defense, could practically render little or
no assistance, although such assistance has been volunteered, and
in one instance-the Suakim Campaign of 1885-has been actually
given, by a colony to Imperial forces engaged at great distance ar.d
in a cause in which that Colony had no direct interest.
But the absence of active participation on the part of a Colony
in a war waged by the Empire is something very different from the
adoption of an attitude of neutrality. Such a position would be as
unprecedented as it is untenable, alike in international law and in
view of the constitutional relations of the Colonies to the Mother
Country.
In view of the declarations of the Prime Minister on more than
one occasion that he is determined to discharge his duty as a loyal
minister of the Crown, I hesitate to assume that he would be prepared to carry out in practice the remarkable doctrine which seems
to be indicated by the passage above quoted. Meanwhile, the ambi-
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guity of the position is creating the most intense anxiety throughout the colony and the bitterest conflict of opinion between different
sections of the inhabitants. Among the supporters of the ministry
there are, no doubt, very many whose racial sympathy with the
ruling class in the South African Republic is stronger than their
feeling of attachment to the Empire. They would contemplate with
aversion the employment of the forces of the Colony against either
of the Republics, and would, at best, sullenly acquiesce in the passage of Imperial forces through the Colony in connection with
military operations beyond its ·borders. On the other hand, there
is a section, equally or almost equally large, which, sympathizing
as it does intensely with the 'policy of Her Majesty's Government,
and feeling the strongest attachment to the Mother Country, would
bitterly resent any attitude approaching to apathy on the part of
the Colony in case of a struggle, to say nothing of interference with
the free movement of Imperial troops. The organized forces of
the Colony, Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Police and Volunteers are
mostly composed of men whose sympathies are 11trongly on the
Imperial side. I anticipate that the immediate future will be productive of very strong protests on the part of the latter section of
the population against the action of the ministry, followed perhaps
by counter-protests from its supporters.
In view of the many uncertainties of the immediate future, it is
premature, and would, it seems to me, be undesirable, to suggest
what course it might be necessary to adopt, in dealing with the
forces and resources oi the Colony, in the event of the relations
between Her Majesty's Government and either or both of the Republics assuming a more unfriendly character. But I have thought it
well to acquaint you with the present position of affairs in order
that Her Majesty's Government may be prepared for the urgent
questions which might, in that case, suddenly arise with regard to
the relations of the Colonial Ministry to the Governor and to Her
Majesty's Government. I will only say, in conclusion, that two considerations ought, in my mind, to be kept in view. The first and
paramount consideration is the· maintenance of the principle that
this colony is, in every sense, part of Her Majesty's dominions, and
cannot be allowed to separate itself, or stand aloof, from any conflict in which the Empire may be engaged. No colonial government
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would, in my opinion, be faithful to its duty which sought, under
such circumstances, to hamper the action of Her Majesty's Government, or to withhold from it any support which the Colony was
capable of giving. On the other hand, I believe it would be good
policy on the part of the Imperial Power to have every regard, consistent with the maintenance of the principle just laid down, for the
feelings of that large number of Cape Colonists who, unfortunately,
are incapable of taking a fair view of the differences existing
between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, or of sympathizing with the former in a conflict with the latter,
however justified such a conflict might be. It would be well, for
that reason, to avoid, if possible, the direct employment of colonial
forces for any purpose but those of the defense of the Colony
itself, though it would be impracticable, in view of the unforeseen
contingencies of war, to lay it down as an absolute rule that they
should under no circumstances be so employed."
The dispatch of the High Commissioner, it must be admitted, '
did not do justice to Mr. Schreiner's position; for not only did it
assume that the policy of the government was one of legal neutrality rather than of military non-intervention, but it also ·overlooked the Premier's express declaration that he would act "in conjunction with the proper authorities" when the necessary occasion
arose. In the light of the contest "the authorities" referred to
could have meant none other than the imperial government or its
representatives. It is equally significant that Sir Alfred found it
necessary to supplement his excellent exposition of the constitutional unity of the Empire by the consideration of certain political
factors which limited in this case the operation of the legal theory.
In short, the question at issue was in reality not a question of law
-but of political expediency, namely, how best to hold the Dutch population to its allegiance. From the standpoint of practical politics,
there was no fundamental difference between the policy of the Pre·
mier and of the High Commissioner. They were both non-inter·
ventionists. The former, however, was guilty of the tactical mistake of expounding his views in parliament to the edification of
his pro-Boer supporters, whereas the latter was discreet enough to
conceal his opinions in a confidential dispatch to his chief.
A few days later Mr. Schreiner discussed the question at length
1
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with the High Commissioner with a view to removing SOII!e of the
popular misconceptions which had arisen regarding his policy. Ir.
the course of a parliamentary reference to this interview, several
months after, he declared that he had never supposed for a moment
that a colony could proclaim its neutrality in the face of a declara•
tion of war by the Empire, nor had he said "anything of the kind."
He had made that point absolutely clear to the government authori·
ties not only so, but his supporters likewise knew right well that
he did not intend tQ maintailil. an attitude of neutrality in the struggle that was about to begin.
A more comprehensive and illuminating account of this interview
may be found in a subsequent letter of the High Commissioner to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies:
"In the course of the conversation, Mr. Schreiner expressed the
feeling that his explanations on <the subject in the House of Assembly had been greatly misunderstood. He protested against his \vords
being interpreted as a declaration that the Colony should remain
neutral in case of hostilities between Her Majesty's Government
and the South African Republic. He had never harboured such
an idea. I replied that in my opinion his words were open to such
construction and that I regretted them. In reply he went on to
state at some length his point of view. The gist of it was that,
while he fully admitted that, in case of war between Her Majesty's
Government and any other state, this colony could not be neutral,
yet he felt that, in the interests of the Empire itself, the two main
objects which colonial ministers should, in that case, keep in view,
would be to prevent civil war breaking out in the Colony and to
guard against the dangers of a native rising. Undoubtedly the forces
of the Colony should be employed to protect the Colony, and he
· would regard any Minister as most culpable who should run the
risk of damage being done to the Colony either from the South
African Republic or the Orange Free State. What ,he deprecated
was the use of colonial forces against republics outside the borders
of the Colony. If they were so used, he feared it might be impossible to restrain a rising on the other side, and there might be a
conflict in the Colony itself.
I told him that I quite agreed that any action which might lead
to a conflict of whites. within the Colony and to consequent unrest
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and· perhaps -rebellion on the part of the natives was to be deprecated. As a matter of grace and policy, Her Majesty's Government would, I ·uelieve, be unwilling, except in the last resort, to
employ Colonial forces for any but purposes of defense. But it
was quite impossible to say, though I did not at present contemplate such an eventuality, that the Colony might not become a base
of ope~tions against a neighboring state, in which case the Government of •the Colony must, of course, loyally cooperate with Her
Majesty's Government and give every assistance to the Imperial
military authorities."
The Secretary for the Colonies closed the correspondence in a
.brief dispatch approving the views of the High Commissioner on
the question of neutrality and also expressing his sati!ifaotion that
Mr. Schreiner "had since explained that his words were not
intended to bear the construction to which they were open." In
conclusion, he likewise concurred in the views of the High Commissioner "that in case of war the colonial forces should, as far as
possible, not be employed directly in offensive operations."
In a speech on the prorogation of parliament on the eve of the
war, '.Mr. S_!:hreiner again took occasion to set forth definitely his
conception of the duty of the colony in case of war.
"I consider, Mr. Speaker, that I only utter what I believe will be
the sentiments of every honorable member of this House when I
say that it will be the general duty of Her Majesty's ministers in
. this colony, and it is the duty of every honorable member of this
House, no matter what side he may stand on, and of every person
or agency of influence in the country to strain for one great object,
and that is, so far as lies within our power, to save our colony as
much as possible from being involved in the vortex of war into
which it is now apparently a certainty that South Africa has been
drawn."
Mr. Schreiner's policy at times seemed tortuous and insincere,
but in view of the difficulties of the situation it could scarcely be
othenvise; it represented, in truth, the compromise between his
political sympathies and prejudices on the one hand and his high
sense ~f duty on the other. His so-called neutrality proposal meant
only that he was unwilling to employ the local forces of the colonies
in offensive operations against the neighboring republics. Such a
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policy, he was convinced, would stir up the bitterest hostility of the
Dutch and lead almost certainly to civil war. For the same reason
he was opposed to the dispatch of coloni~l troops to Kimberley and
the border towns prior to the outbreak of war, for fear that it
might provoke the Boers to hasty belligerent action. His policy,
in fact, was governed by the desire to avoid any provocative action
towards either the Boer republics or the Dutch population of the
Cape. Upon one matter he was firmly resolved, namely, that whatever .the outcome neither he nor his government should be chargeable in any way with responsibility for the war.
The views of the Premier, unfortunately, were not shared by all
his followers. Some of his supporters were desirous of proclaiming the neutrality of the Cape in the event of war. l'he extreme
Africander section of the party, under the nominal leadership of
Te Water, would gladly have closed the ports and railroads of the
colony to British troops and supplies and have refused to cooperate
with the imperial forces in any way. Some of them did not hesitate to carry on 'treasonable correspondence with the heads of the
enemy states. They kept up a constant series of attacks upon the
High Commissioner and the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
but they did not dare to challenge the position of the Prime Minister in open parliament.
In the end, the question came up in a somewhat different form
from what Mr. Schreiner had anticipated. The Boers assumed the
offensive at the outset, crossed the Orange River into the Cape and
proceeded to enlist Dutch sympathizers in their forces. The question was no longer one of colonial pal'ticipation in a war of aggression aga\nst the Dutch Republics, but of the defense of British
colonial territory against the invasion of the enemies' forces.
The precipitous action of the Boers greatly simplified Mr. Schreiner's problem. Nevertheless, he still hesitated. AHer some delay,
martial law was declared in the invaded districts, but there was still
some time ·before he consented to call out the military forces of
the colony for the defense of its >territory. The colony was indeed
sorely distracted. The British loyalists and their Dutch allies were
clamoring for the raising of volunteer ·forces, while at the same
time the bui:ghers were appealing to the government not to be called
out for active service: Under the provisions of the burgher law,
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every able-bodied colonist was liable to military service, but the
government wisely declined to put the act into operation. It would
have been the height.of folly to have attempted to do so. With a
view to quieting the apprehension of the burghers, Mr. Schreiner
sent a circular to the civil commissioners and resident magistrates
throughout the colony announcing that "It is not intended to call
out the burgher forces, as it is considered that the military forces
of the Crown are sufficient to preserve or in case of a temporary
invasion of the enemy to restore order and that all tha:t is expected
by the government of the ordinary citizen is that he should remain
loyal to Her Majesty and give no countenance or assistance to her
enemies now invading this colony.''. Thi~ proclamation undoubtedly had ~ beneficial effect upon the Dutch, even though it stirred
up much heart-'burning among the loyalists. The policy of the
government, in the words of the Premier, was "to employ the regular forces of the Crown rather than local volunteers, because when
the war was over the military forces would go, but the local forces
remained in the country, and it was his object and policy to avoid
as much as possible the use of the voluntary forces in the colony
and so to spare the people of the colony when the war was over the
legacy of feud and hostility."
The question of neutrality did not arise in the sister state of
Natal. The population of that colony was loyal to the core. From
the very beginning of the controversy with the Transvaal the people
of Natal had manifested a keen interest in the grievances of the
Uitlanders and throughout the negotiations the government had
strongly supported the policy of the High Commissioner. On the
outbreak of the war the government called out the militia at once
and proceeded to put the colony on an effective war basis. There
was no thought of non-participation or of neutrality. On the contrary, both government and people threw themselves most heartily
into the struggle and made it particularly their own.
The correspondence on the question of neutrality was duly laid
before the British parliament, but, strange to say, it failed i:o attract
any attention in the House of Commons. The popular chamber
was too much absorbed in the bitter controversy over the origin
of the war and the conduct <thereof to give much consideration to
the constitutional aspects of the subject. The attitude of the House
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of Commons on ~mperial questions has always been liopelessly provincialistic, and this case proved no exception to the rule.
The subject, however, did not escape the attention of the House
of Lords. On March 29, 1900,-the Earl of Camperdown addressed
a series of questions 1o the government: " (I) Whether the duty
of self-defense is imposed on a self-governing colony. (2) Whether,
in the event of war between Her Majesty's government and a for- eign power, a self-governing colony can declare itself neutral. (3)
Whether a colonial government which declines to call out its forces
or otherwise defend its colonial territory against invasion is liable
to compensate those who suffer damage within the territory from
the enemy." Responsible government, he declared, implied certain
obligations as well as privileges, but the English government had
apparently never laid down in definite words what these obligations
• were. The duty of self-defense would, in his judgment, naturally
be one of the obligations which a self-governing colony might be
expected to assume. But for the recent pronouncement of Mr.
Schreiner he would never have supposed that a colony could declare
its neutrality. ",The colonies have no representation abroad and
they have no foreign policy of their own." Both before and subsequent to tlie outbreak of the war, the Cape Premier had failed
to take necessary measures for the defense of the colony, and as
a result the loyal British and Dutch colonials had suffered serious
losses. He desired to know, therefore, who was responsible for
these losses. Would the British or colonial taxpayers be called
upon to make good the damage?
In his reply, the Earl of Selborne, Parliamentary Secretary to
the Colonial Office, took pains to guard himself against "attempting to frame any new maxims on the complicated constitutional
problems" which the questions raised. In case of actual invasion,
a self-governing colony, he laid down, "would be bound tQ do all
in its power to defend its
territory, but there would be also
an obligation of honor which we hold to be absolute on the Mother
Country to do what she can to assist the colony." The general
principles governing the respective mili~ary obligations of° the
Mother Country and self-governing colonies in time of peace were
fairly well understood. In case_of a naval attack, the colonies would
be e:i.1Jected to look after the land defenses, while the British gov-
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ernment would take charge of the coaling stations and attack by
sea. There was, however, to the Dest of his knowledge, no settled
principle in the case of a land attack.
In regard to the second question, whether, in the event of war
between Her Majesty and a foreign power, a self-governing colony could declare itself neutral, his lordship affirmed "it is perfectly obvious that no part of Her Majesty's dominions can claim
to be at peace with a power with which Her Majesty is at war."
Upon the third question, as to the liability of a colonial govern""
ment for failure to afford adequate protection to its subjects, he
declined to express an opinion. The question presented a purely
abstract proposition which had no bearing on the existing situation
in South Africa. The Cape government had not declined to call
out its forces, as had been alleged. "It has called out its forces to
the extent to which it, and I may also say the Government, COIL""
siders it wise that they should be called out," in view of the doubt-·
ful loyalty of many of the burgher population. This explanati~n
'yas apparently satisfactory to the Earl of Camperdown and other
members of the House, as the subject was dropped without further
question.
With characteristic English political opportunism, the English
· government and parliament soon forgot all about the embarrassitig
constitutional questions at issue. They have always been prone to
·put off their difficulties to a more convenient season and to trust to'
a kind providence to help them out of their troubles when a solution could no longer be postponed. "Sufficient unto the day is the
evil thereof" has been the motto of British colonial policy. With
the termination of the war the question of colonial n~utrality agaill!
became an academic issue, and suffered the usual fate of all such
questions.
The South African war, however, did serve the purpose of bringing out clearly the anomalous constitutional position of the dominions in time of war. In this incident may be seen a striking illustration of that divergence between law and practice which is as
marked a characteristic of the imperial as of the English constitution. From the standpoint of constitutional law, the British
Empire was one and indivisible in war as in peace. One part of
the Empire could not be at peace while others were at war, This
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fundamental principle was recognized alike by English and colonial
states¥1en. No colony was empowered or entitled to throw off its
allegiance at will or to absolve itself from the performance of its
constitutional obligations at home or abroad. In short, there was
no constitutional right of collective expatriation or even neutrality
on the part of any of the dominions. At the same time, the English
government clearly recognized that, according to the convention of
the imperial constitution, the colonies were free to determine for
themselves whether and to what e.~tent, if any, they would actively
participate in imperial wars. The dominion governments had the
sole responsibility of determining when and under what conditions
colonial forces should be employed outside of their own borders.
A royal declaration of-war undoubtedly bound all the king's subjects and possessions, but it did not automatically involve the colonies in active naval or military operations. The colonies were still
free to join forces with the Mother Country or to maintain an atti-'
tude of benevolent neutrality if they shoul~ see fit so to do. There
was no doubt but that the dominions were ready and willing to
come to the aid of the Mother Country in case of a great emergency, but they were equally resolved not to be drawn into imperial
ventures and expeditions in which they had no special interest and
of which they might possibly disapprove. In short, they claimed
to be free-will agents in respect to foreign wars, and this principle
:was not seriously challenged by the Colonial Office. The views of
Mr. Schreiner upon <this point were very similar to those of his illustrious Canadian contemporary, Sir Wilfrid Laurier. "If England
is at war, we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we
shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part
in all the wars of England. That is a matter which must be determined by circumstances upon which the Canadian parliament will
have to pronounce. It will have to decide in its own best judgment."
But this policy of non-participation is far removed from the
modern conception of neutrality with its strict rules not only against
intermeddling in the war but also against any use or abuse of the
neutral territory for belligerent purposes. There was here no claim
of a new international status or embryonic independence, no proclamation of neutrality or declaration of immunity of the ships, ports
and territory of the dominion. The pronunciamento of the Cape
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Town Premier was a mere matter of internal economy affecting
only the constitutional relations of the colonies and the Mother
Land. It had no international validity or effect nor were foreign
governments under the slightest obligation to take due notice
thereof. From the standpoint of international law the status of
the dominions was unchanged. The colonies were still integral portions of the Emptre, whose fate in time of war was bound up with
that of the Mother Country. The Boer Republics were indeed
fully justified in treating the South African colonies as enemy territory, and as such open 1o invasion and conquest, the same as any
other portion of the king's possessions. Only a declaration of independence could have changed the belligerent character of Cape Colony and have· converted it into a neutral state.
This incident did possess, however, considerable constitutional
and international significance. It marked an important stage in
the progress of the dominions from dependence to statehood. It
was but a short step from voluntary inaction to free and independent action in foreign affairs. Jan Smuts has taken up the mantle
of his distinguished fellow-countryman as the prophet of the new
school of national or liberal imperialists who look to the solution
of the Empire's external problems, not ·by cutting the painter, but
through the reorganization of the Empire upon the basis of an
association of free and equal states. In other words,· they aim to
set. up a British league of nations, the members of which would be
entitled to determine their own policies in respect to war, peace and
foreign relations. The splendid sacrifices of the colonial troops on
the fields of France won for the dominions the right to international recognition. That right was conceded by the covenant of the
League of Nations. The dominions were at last admitted as fullfledged members into the family of nations. The conference at
Cannes gave practical expression to the new policy of international
freedom. The days of colonial tutelage were over. Under the
terms of the proposed Anglo-French alliance the dominions were
free to decide their own foreign policy in war as in peace. It is .
too early as yet to declare that the old policy of non-participation
has given place to a new doctrine of neutrality, but an important
precedent has been established and the tendency of imperial development lies in that direction. The question still remains, to what
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extertt will foreign states be i,villing to respect a declaration of neuttality on the part of a dominion in the case of war i,Vith the Mother
Country. To that question no answer is now, forthcoming; it must
be left to the determination of time.
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